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CONTRACTS IN PARTICULAR
Saul Litvinoff*
SALES-REDHB ITION-DEATH
Doughty v. General Motors Corp.' raised the question
whether the action in redhibition is personal or heritable.
Action was brought by heirs of the deceased purchaser of an
automobile against the manufacturer of the vehicle following
an accident fatal to the purchaser. In the opinion of the
majority of the court, there was no privity of contract be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants; it followed that plaintiffs
had only an action in tort which the court found had pre-
scribed.
It is unquestionable however that an action in redhibition
is heritable, as suggested in a concurring opinion in the
Doughty case.2 Indeed, according to Louisiana Civil Code arti-
cle 1999, every obligation must be regarded as heritable on
both sides unless the contrary is either clearly expressed or
necessarily implied from the nature of the contract.3 That the
rights arising from a valid contract are also vested in the
parties' heirs is a principle clearly asserted in Civil Code
article 1963(4). 4
In support of its conclusion, the opinion of the majority
invoked Cartwright v. Chrysler Corp.5 In that case, it is true,
the supreme court found lack of privity between the parties,
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 303 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
2. Id. at 203.
3. Refer to LA. CIv. CODE art. 1997: "An obligation is strictly personal,
when none but the obligee can enforce the performance, or when it can be
enforced only against the obligor. It is heritable when the heirs and assigns
of the one party may enforce the performance against the heirs of the other.
It is real when it is attached to immovable property, and passes with it into
whatever hands it may come, without making the third possessor personally
responsible."
4. In Ferguson v. Thomas, 3 Mart. (N.S.) 75 (1824), it was said: "All obliga-
tions pass to the heirs, active as well as passive, save those in which the
promisor's personal qualities (e.g., those of a painter or physician) were the
leading motive of the contract, and the want of which another cannot supply,
nor pecuniary damages compensate. In such cases the heirs cannot insist on
performing the contract." In the same context, see also Comment, Heritabil-
ity of Conventional Obligations, 31 TUL. L. REV. 324 (1957).
5. 255 La. 598, 232 So. 2d 285 (1970).
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but the action brought by plaintiff was not against the man-
ufacturer of his own car, but against the manufacturer of
another vehicle which, allegedly owing to a defect, had hit the
rear of plaintiff's car.6 That no privity exists in that situation
is quite clear. That the facts in Cartwright differ diametri-
cally from the facts in Doughty is equally clear. The alleged
lack of privity between heirs of the purchaser and the man-
ufacturer thus finds support neither in the Civil Code nor in
the jurisprudence.
Aside from the problem of privity, a certain assumption
about the nature of the proper action in instances of products
liability seems to pervade the Doughty decision. Quoting from
Cartwright, the court in Doughty said:
While there are numerous appellate court decisions pro-
viding "A manufacturer or seller of a product which in-
volves a risk or injury to the user is liable to any person,
whether the purchaser or a third person, who without fault
on his part sustains an injury caused by a defect in the
design or manufacture of the article, if the injury might
have been reasonably anticipated," the fact remains that
such action is one in tort and not in contract.7
That contention has been the subject of intense con-
troversy and revision in recent times in connection with the
decision rendered by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Media
Productions Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North
America, Inc.8 It is settled that an injured party who is not a
purchaser may act in tort against the manufacturer of a
defective product.9 Whether that is true in the case of an
6: Id. at 599, 232 So. 2d at 286.
7. Id. (emphasis added).
8. 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972). See Note, 33 LA. L. REV. 724 (1973);
Note, 47 TUL. L. REV. 473 (1973). See also Babst, Redhibition and Tort: Are
They Enough?, 22 LA. B. J. 19 (1974); Campbell, The Remedy of Redhibition: A
Cause Gone Wrong, 22 LA. B. J. 27 (1974).
9. For a general discussion, see Mazeaud, La responsabilitM civile du
vendeur-fabricant, 53 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 611, 620 (1955).
See Simon v. Ford Motor Co., 282 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973); Le Blanc v. Louisiana
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952); Landry v. Adam, 282
So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Wisdom v. Ford Motor Co., 256 So. 2d 298
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Miller v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 70 So. 2d
409 (La. App. Orl. 1954). See also Tuminello v: Mawby, 220 La. 733, 57 So. 2d
666 (1952); George v. Shreveport Cotton & Oil Co., 114 La. 498, 38 So. 432
(1905); Meche v. Farmers Drier & Storage Co., 193 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 3rd
Cir. 1967).
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injured purchaser of a defective product is at least question-
able after Media.10 The grounds of that decision and the many
reasons that make redhibition a practical and effective
weapon in the battle for consumer protection have been
explored elsewhere." Generally, however, the usefulness of
redhibition has been praised from the perspective of patrimo-
nial damage suffered by a consumer. Doughty raises the rela-
tively novel question whether redhibition, unquestionably
contractual in nature, is equally effective to provide a remedy
for physical injury suffered by a consumer, a question pre-
termitted in the concurring opinion.' 2
According to Louisiana Civil Code article 2545, a seller
who knows of the vice of the thing he sells and omits to
declare it is answerable to the buyer not only for restitution
of the price and expenses but also in damages. The language
of article 2545 is broad enough as to comprise damages for
bodily injury. In addition, a manufacturer falls under a pre-
sumption of knowledge of defects in things of his making in
accordance with the principle spondet peritiam artis.13
In French doctrine, the weight of authority favors the
view that under article 1645 of the Code Napoleon, equivalent
to Louisiana Civil Code article 2545, a manufacturer is liable
for physical injury suffered by a purchaser of his product
owing to its defects. 14 To enforce the liability, a purchaser
disappointed by a defective thing or injured as a result of his
10. See Note, 33 LA. L. REV. 724 (1973); Note, 47 TUL. L. REV. 473 (1973).
11. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term-Sales, 35 LA. L. REV. 259, 310 (1975). See also Barham, Redhibition: A
Comparative Comment, 49 TUL. L. REV. 376 (1975).
12. See Doughty v. General Motors Corp., 303 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974).
13. See Radalec Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 228 La. 116, 81 So. 2d 830
(1955); 3 (EUVRES DE POTHIER, CONTENANT LES TRAITES DU DROlT FRANCAIS
88 (Bugnet ed. 1861); Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14
TUL L. REV. 529, 539 (1940).
14. MAZEAUD, MAZEAUD ET TuNc, TRArrt THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
LAW RESPONSABILIT CIVILE D19LICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 232-33 (5th
ed. 1957); Cornu, Contrats sp~ciaux-Vente, 61 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE
DROrr CML 564 (1963); Demogue, De l'obligation du vendeur a raison des
inconv~nients de la chose, 22 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CML 645, 648
(1923); Malinvaud, La responsabitits civile du vendeur & raison des vices de la
chose, 42 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE § 32 at 2153 (1968); Mazeaud, La responsabi-
lite civile du vendeur-fabricant, 53 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 611,
616-17 (1955); Savatier, note to Entreprise de canalisations et de travaux
publics v. consorts Ravaille, La semaine juridique 13159 (1963).
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use of it may sue the vendor's vendor or any other party in
the chain of transferors of the thing ending with the original
manufacturer. 5 Furthermore, contemporary French writers
speak of the warranty against redhibitory vices as a true
warranty of safety owed by the vendor.' 6 On numerous occa-
sions, French courts have found vendor-manufacturers liable
for bodily injury caused by things of their making.17
The same interpretation of Louisiana Civil Code article
2545 would equip an injured vendee with a proper contractual
remedy, an advantage to which he is entitled by virtue of the
contract.18 The victim of an unfulfilled contractual obligation
should not be cast in the same position as the victim of a
quasi-delict, upon whose shoulders rests the burden of proof.19
In a situation like the one here discussed, an injured vendee
15. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974
Term--Sales, 35 LA. L. REV. 259, 313. See also 9 ToULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL
FRANQAIS 121 (Duvergier ed. 1838): "Successive contracts of sale, in transfer-
ring ownership of the thing also transfer, from hand to hand and as acces-
sories, all actions in warranty arising from each sale which are finally re-
united in the hands of the last purchaser." This is so because the vendor
transfers the thing cum omnis causa, that is, with whatever pertains to it.
See 17 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET SAIGNAT, TRAITe THPORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL-DE LA VENTE ET DE L'PCHANGE 369 (2d ed. 1900).
16. See Mazeaud, La responsabilith civile du vendeur-fabricant, 53 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 611, 612 (1955): "To the obligation concerning
vices, extensively regulated in articles 1641-49 of the civil code, of Roman
inspiration through the channels of Domat and Pothier, the recent jurispru-
dence has added another obligation: the obligation of safety (lobligation de
s~curitM). For the benefit of the vendee, a contract of sale places the vendor
under an obligation of safety; in case of damage caused to the vendee by the
thing sold, the vendor may thus have engaged his contractual responsibility"
(translation by author). See also Malinvaud, La responsabilit6 civile du ven-
deur & raison des vices de la chose, 42 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE § 32 at 2153
(1968).
17. See CASS. June 4, 1954, D.1954.708, and decisions cited in Mazeaud, La
responsabili civile du vendeur-fabricant, 53 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE
DROIT CIVIL 611, 618 (1955). In an interesting case involving a fatal au-
tomobile accident the court dismissed an action brought against an inter-
mediate vendor in good faith, but authoritative comment on the case asserts
that the ultimate liability of the manufacturer, whom plaintiff did not join in
the suit, is left unimpaired by the decision. See note by Savatier to Entre-
prises de canalisations et de travaux publics v. Consorts Ravaille in La
semaine juridique 13159 (1963).
18. For a discussion of this aspect as well as the difficulties involved in
the problem of cumul or accumulation of actions in contract and tort, see
MAZEAUD, MAZEAUD ET TUNC, supra, note 14 at 225-33.
19. See 2 S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 182 in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 341 (1969).
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is entitled to the minimum advantage represented by having
the short prescriptive term run from the moment the vice is
discovered, in accordance with article 2546 of the Louisiana
Civil Code. The last problem in the Doughty decision involves
the date of discovery of the redhibitory vice as the starting
point of the prescriptive period of article 2546. According to
plaintiffs, the vice was discovered upon reception of a letter
from General Motors advising of a possible safety hazard in
cars of that make and year. For the court, instead, the date of
discovery is the date of the accident. 20 For its conclusion the
court invoked Landry v. Adam,21 which lends no support to
such a contention. Landry holds that a recall letter from an
automobile manufacturer is not admissible to prove that a
particular automobile contained a certain defect at the time
of the accident, and that such a fact must be proved by direct
evidence. 22 The evidentiary weight of a letter of recall in
regard to the existence of a particular defect in a particular
car is one thing and the ability of the letter to create an
awareness of the possible existence of a defect is another
thing altogether. "Discovery," in the intendment of article
2546 of the Louisiana Civil Code, is the latter and not the
former.
CONTRACT FOR MEDICAL SERVICES
Steel v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co.2 again raised the
dramatic controversy between contractual and delictual lia-
bility. After finding that plaintiffs' action for medical mal-
practice had prescribed in one year under the provisions of
Louisiana Civil Code article 3536, applicable to offenses and
quasi-offenses, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal said that a
medical malpractice claim cannot be brought on a contract
theory unless the physician has warranted or promised a
particular result.2
Such no doubt is the common law approach. 25 As is
20. Doughty v. General Motors Corp., 303 So. 2d 202, 204 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1974).
21. 282 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
22. Id. at 596.
23. 304 So. 2d 861 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
24. Id. at 864.
25. See 70 C.J.S., Physicians and Surgeons § 57, 981-82; 41 AM. JUR.,
Physicians and Surgeons, § 104, 219 [cited by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Phelps v. Donaldson, 243 La. 118, 150 So. 2d 35 (1963)]. See also Note, 34 TUL.
L. REV. 414 (1960).
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known, in that system negligence is a specific tort and not
merely a blemish on an obligor's performance of his duties,
either contractual or legal, as in the civil law. 26 In the
Anglo-Saxon legal perspective, a negligent act is analyzed as
"tortious" and exclusively governed by the rules of extracon-
tractual liability. From a civilian standpoint, a negligent act
of an obligor may engage his contractual liability even when
the contract contains no stipulation for a specific result.27
It is quite clear that underlying the controversy between
contractual and delictual liability is the question of the bur-
den of proof. 28 Traditionally, in delictual actions plaintiff
bears the burden of proof while the burden shifts to the de-
fendant when an action is brought in contract. The result of
such a view is that in many instances courts are probably
loath to allow a claim in contract under the impression that
plaintiff's burden would be greatly, and perhaps unfairly, al-
leviated if that were done.29 When medical malpractice is
concerned, public policy implications may warrant such an
attitude.30
For a long time the same approach prevailed in civilian
jurisdictions.3 1 In this century, however, a significant depar-
ture started in France through the discovery of a new crite-
rion for the classification of obligations. As first expounded by
an eminent scholar in 1925, besides the classical to give and to
do or not to do, obligations may be classified, from the view-
point of the performance owed by an obligor, into those of
result (obligation de r6sultat), that is, obligations to provide a
26. See CRItPEAU, CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY: A CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS A
REDISCOVERY OF CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY, ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS, 83, 85 (Dainow ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as CRItPEAU]. See
generally L. MILLNER, NEGLIGENCE IN MODERN LAW (1972). See also CRIt-
PEAU at 85.
27. See 6 DEMOGUE, TRArlt DES OBLIGATIONS EN GNtRAL 184-88 (1931)
[hereinafter cited as 6 DEMOGUE; 1 MAZEAUD, MAZEAUD ET TUNC, supra,
note 14 at 190-223.
28. For a general discussion of important differences between the two
regimes of liability, see Percy, Products Liability-Tort or Contract or What?,
40 TuL. L. REV. 715, 726 (1966); Note, 47 TUL. L. REV. 473, 479 (1973). In the
text above, however, the discussion will be focused on the burden of proof.
29. CRtPEAU at 98.
30. Mettarlin, Contractual and Delictual Responsibility in Quebec: The
Rediscovery of Contract, 8 McGILL L. J. 38, 49-50 (1961). See also Cr~peau, La
responsabilit6 m~dicale et hospitali re dans la jurisprudence qu4b~coise re-
cnte, 20 REVUE DU BARREAU 433, 438 (1960).
31. CRtPEAU at 99; 6 DEMOGUE at 184 (1931).
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certain and definite or specified result, and those of means
(obligation de moyen), that is, obligations to provide or employ
certain means, without implying any promise of achieving a
specific result.32 Thus, the obligation of a carrier of goods
under article 2754 of the Louisiana Civil Code, that of a build-
er according to a plot under article 2769, and that of a seller
under articles 2475 and 2476 are examples of obligations of
result according to the description of the pertinent duties in
those articles. Under article 2746, however, the obligation of a
lessor of labor or industry is one of means, that is, an obliga-
tion to use certain skills for a particular purpose. A bank, for
instance, in accepting deposits from the public, assumes an
obligation of result, namely, that the money will be made
readily available to the depositor on demand. In letting out a
safe-deposit box, the same bank assumes only an obligation of
means, namely, to provide security measures for the custody
of the box.3 3 It follows naturally that the contractual obliga-
tion of a physician is one of means, that is, to provide the
skills of his profession and the benefit of his scientific knowl-
edge towards the patient's cure, but without warranting a
result.34 If that were not so, as Demogue reflected, physicians
would have to prove a fortuitous event or an irresistible force
in order to elude liability any time their patients die in spite
of their efforts, which does not seem to be the case.35
The new approach to classification, introduced into Lou-
isiana legal doctrine not long ago, calls for a re-examination
of traditional conclusions about the burden of proof when
a breach of defendant's obligation is alleged.36 In re-ex-
amination, contractual or delictual liability is no longer the
32. 5 DEMOGUE, TRAITt DES OBLIGATIONS EN GItNI9RAL 538-545 (1925)
[hereinafter cited as 5 DEMOGUE]. See also COMPARATO, ESSAI D'ANALYSE
DUALISTE DE L'OBLIGATION EN DROIT PRIV9 37 (1964); 1 MAZEAUD, MAZEAUD
ET TUNC, supra, note 14 at 115-22; TUNC, LA DISTINCTION DES OBLIGATIONS
DE R9SULTAT ET DES OBLIGATIONS DE DILIGENCE, JURIS-CLASSEUR PERI-
ODIQUE I 449 n.54 (1945).
33. See 5 DEMOGUE 539. Demogue's novel classification was carried
further in the work of other writers who speak in terms. of a tripartite
classification, namely, obligation of result, obligation of diligence and pru-
dence (means) and obligation of warranty (obligation de garantie). See
MAZEAUD, MAZEAUD ET TUNC, supra, note 14 at 113-17.
34. 5 DEMOGUE at 540; 6 DEMOGUE at 134-38. See also CRfPEAU at 98-99.
35. 5 DEMOGUE at 540.
36. Obligations of results and obligations of means are discussed in 1 S.
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 27 in 6 LOUISIANA CIvIL LAW TREATISE 47, 48
(1969) [hereinafter cited as 1 LITVINOFF].
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sole criterion to determine the onus probandi. Defendant may
have breached a contractual obligation, and the burden of
proof may still rest on the plaintiff's shoulders. It all depends
on whether the breached contractual obligation was one of
results or one of means or diligence.37 It can now be readily
understood that if the obligor's contractual duty was merely
one of means or diligence, to establish a failure in the perfor-
mance of such duty the obligee will have to prove that the
obligor did not take the care reasonably expected of him
under the circumstances, that he did not act as a bonus pater
familia8--or prudent administrator in Louisiana legal par-
lance.- In other words, the obligee must prove negligence, a
fairly severe burden no doubt.39 If instead the obligation is of
result, the obligee's burden is less onerous, as the obligor's
failure to produce the stipulated result gives rise to a pre-
sumption of fault on his part, a presumption of which he can
rid himself only by proving a fortuitous event or irresistible
force.40
By adopting the modern distinction between contractual
obligations of results and those of means or diligence, a fal-
lacy latent in the traditional dichotomy of delictual and con-
tractual liability was finally dispelled. As not all contractual
duties are obligations of result, the traditional distinction lost
significance regarding the burden of proof. Thus, in the
example of a bank, if the depositor's money is not returned on
demand, that is as much as he must prove to engage the
bank's liability for the breach of its obligation of result.41 If
securities or other valuables placed in a safe-deposit box are
missing, however, the client-lessee must prove that because
of the bank's dereliction of its duty of diligence, namely the
obligation to provide adequate security measures, the con-
tents of the box were stolen.42
Recognizing the accuracy and importance of the new
classification, French courts changed their approach to cases
37. 5 DEMOGUE 538-45. See also CRIPEAU at 98; Metlarlin, supra, note 30
at 44.
38. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1908; CR]kPEAU at 97.
39. 5 DEMOGUE at 543, MARTINE, L'OPTION ENTRE LA RESPONSABILIT
CONTRACTUELLE ET LA RESPONSABILITI D9LICTUELLE 16, 26 (1957); MA-
ZEAUD,,MAZEAUD ET TUNC, supra, note 14 at 772-73.
40. CRIPEAU at 97.
41. 5 DEMOGUE 539.
42. Id.
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involving a physician's liability in 1936. 4 3 In that year, the
Cour de cassation decided that a physician may be held liable
ex contractu, and that the patient may yet be held to prove
that the doctor has not exercised due care in the performance
of his professional duties. Since then, French courts have
asserted that the obligations of a physician vis-a-vis his pa-
tient are contractual obligations of means or diligence gener-
ally, and that the liability engaged for the breach of such
obligations is therefore contractual in nature.44 The courts in
Quebec have followed the same approach since 1957. 4 5
The result of the French approach is that, though the
burden of proof as to the physician's lack of care is on the
plaintiff, as in cases in which the liability involved is delictu-
al, all other technical aspects of the contractual regime, such
as the very important one of prescription, are applicable.46
Noticeably, the handling of the problem with civil code tools
leads to that solution in a natural way. A glance at article
1903 of the Louisiana Civil Code suffices to show that a physi-
cian is bound by an obligation of diligence as a matter of
course.47 While this conclusion is not totally ignored at com-
mon law, when it has obtained, it has been done by straining
familiar concepts, as by asserting that the action is one in
tort, though inexplicably-or miraculously?-subject to a con-
tractual prescriptive term or by dramatic discovery of an
implied-in-fact contractual relation between doctor and pa-
tient at common law. 48
43. See CIv. May 20, 1936, D.1936.1.88, rapp. Josserand, S.1937.1.321, note
by Breton.
44. See CIV. June 27, 1939, D.C.1941.53, note by Nast, S.1940.1.73, note by
Morel; Civ. July 13, 1949, D.1949.423; Grenoble, Nov. 4, 1946, D.1947.I.79; Paris
Oct. 18, 1949, D.1949.538; Pau, March 12, 1953, D.1953 somm. 75; Aix, Nov. 10,
1953, D.1954.11.
45. See X. v. Mellen, B.R. 389 (1957); G. v. C. B.R. 161 (1960); Beausoleil v.
La Communaut6 des Soeurs de la charit6, B.R. 37 (1965); Hotel Dieu St.
Vallier v. Martel, B.R. 389 (1968); citations in CRtPEAU at 99; Mettarlin,
supra, note 30 at 43-44.
46. MAZEAUD, MAZEAUD ET TUNC, supra, note 14 at 183-89. See also
CRfPEAU at 98-99; MARTINE supra, note 39 at 22-26.
47. That article reads: "The obligation of contracts extends not only to
what is expressly stipulated, but also to everything that, by law, equity or
custom, is considered as incidental to the particular contract, or necessary to
carry it into effect." For a general discussion of the determination of the
obligational content of a contract see Cr~peau, Le contenu obligationnel d'un
contrat, 43 CAN. BAR REV. 3 (1965).
48. For cases applying a contractual prescriptive term, see Vanhooser v.
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If the obligation de moyen approach were adopted by
Louisiana courts it would become unmistakeably clear that
Louisiana Civil Code article 3544, not article 3536, governs
prescription in situations like the one in Steel v. Aetna Life &
Casualty .49
It must be recognized that in rendering the Steel decision
the court expressed clear misgivings and finally chose to
avoid conflict with the ruling of the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Phelps v. Donaldson,50 rather than draw subtle distinctions
as another court did in Creighton v. Karlin l and Barrios v.
Sara Mayo Hospital.5 2 The holding in Phelps, however, is fif-
teen years old. It is not unprecedented for a Louisiana appel-
late court to depart from directions by the state's highest
court, especially when the passage of time allows a new
perspective on certain legal conflicts. 53
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
The always interesting problem of the relation between
the law of Louisiana and "accord and satisfaction" has been
brought into focus again in Charles X. Miller, Inc. v. Oak
Builders, Inc.54 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal holds in
that case that, against the background of a dispute between
the parties, the negotiation of a check received "in full pay-
ment" operates as an accord and satisfaction, even if the
endorsement has been changed from payment in full to part
payment.5 5 To arrive at that conclusion the court said that
estoppel by accord and satisfaction is a common law concept
judicially incorporated into the Louisiana jurisprudence by
the Louisiana Supreme Court, and grounded on basic con-
tractual principles of offer and acceptance.5 6
Berghoff, 90 Mo. 487 (1886); Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.
Supp. 529 (1st Dept. 1930); Kernodle v. Elder, 23 Okla. 743, 102 Pac. 138 (1909).
For the discovery of an implied-in-fact contract at common law, see Peterson
v. Phelps, 123 Minn. 319, 143 N.W. 793 (1913); Parkell v. Fitzporter, 301 Mo.
217, 256 S.W. 239 (1923); Note, 43 TUL. L. REV. 414 (1960).
49. 303 So. 2d 861 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
50. 243 La. 1118, 150 So. 2d 35 (1963).
51. 225 So. 2d 288 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
52. 264 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
53. See Coulon v. Anthony Hamlin, Inc. 93 So. 2d 557 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1957); Collet v. Otis, 80 So. 2d 117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955). See also Tate,
Techniques of Judicial Interpretation, 22 LA. L. REV. 727 (1962).
54. 306 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
55. Id. at 452.
56. Id. at 451.
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The true nature of accord and satisfaction, and whether it
harmonizes with the civil law of Louisiana, cannot be deter-
mined without an inquiry into the civil law "transaction" and
the common law "compromise" and "accord. ' 57 Under Lou-
isiana Civil Code article 3071, a transaction or compromise is
an agreement by which the parties make reciprocal conces-
sions in order to prevent litigation or to put an end to it.58
Unlike article 2044 of the Code Napoleon, the Louisiana pre-
cept contains an indication of the means to be used to achieve
the purpose, namely, an adjustment of differences by mutual
consent.5 9 As clearly formulated by the Louisiana jurispru-
dence, that adjustment of differences, preferred by each
party to the hope of gaining balanced by the danger of losing,
constitutes the only cause needed for the validity of the con-
tract.
6 0
At common law, an agreement settling a dispute, either
in or out of court, in view of the uncertainty between the
parties regarding the facts, or the facts and the law together,
is a compromise.6 1 If a claim is subject to dispute in good
faith, payment or other performance by the debtor is held to
be a sufficient consideration for a return promise. 62 At first
blush, that seems to conflict with the common law rule that
performance of a pre-existing duty is not a sufficient consid-
eration. The conflict is tentatively resolved by casting some
doubt on the duty that allegedly pre-exists and saying that
the debtor need not consider himself bound to pay until a
court orders him to do so; hence, if he offers some perfor-
mance without such an order, that furnishes the considera-
tion.6 3 On the other hand,
57. For a full discussion, see 1 LrrvINoFF § 372-99 at 636-76.
58. Id. § 388 at 654-55.
59. Id. § 372 at 636-37.
60. See Gregory v. Central Coal & Coke Corp., 179 La. 95, 200 So. 832
(1941).
61. O'Hare v. Peterson, 150 Neb. 151, 33 N.W.2d 566 (1948); Cole v. Har-
vey, 200 Okla. 564, 198 P.2d 199 (1948, Matthews v. Matthews, 49 Me. 586
(1863); Cannavina v. Poston, 13 Wash. 2d 182, 124 P.2d 787 (1942). For a
general discussion, see 1 LITVINOFF § 331 at 641.
62. W. ANSON, CONTRACTS 92 (2d ed. Guest 1959) [hereinafter cited as
ANSON]; A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 187 at 270 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
CORBIN]; G. GRIsMORE, CONTRACTS 107 (Murray ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited
as GRisMORE]; S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 128 (1938) [hereinafter cited as
WILLISTON].
63. 1 LITVINOFF § 381 at 641 (1969). It is frequently stated that the law
favors compromise. E.g., W.J. Perrynan & Co. v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 324
F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1963); Rome v. Archer, 41 Del. 404, 197 A.2d 49 (1964).
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[r]eduction of litigation by mutual agreement of litigants
is much to the public interest; and in order to attain this
desired end, it is necessary to sustain the compromise
agreement without regard to whether the claim was cor-
rect or incorrect.6 4
So far, the equivalence between a civilian transaction and a
common law compromise is inescapable, which amply justifies
the dual designation adopted in Book 3, Title XVII, article
3071 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
Closely related to compromise, the common law provides
other interesting categories. Thus, an "accord executory" is
an agreement for the future discharge of an existing claim by
a substituted performance.6 5 It is the promised performance
that is to discharge the existing claim, and not the promise to
render the performance.6 6 It makes no difference whether the
claim is liquidated or not, disputed or undisputed, although
these facts will bear upon the sufficiency of the consideration
for the promises in the new agreement.6 7
As a matter of fact, most compromise agreements are
executory accords; but a compromise may also be a substi-
tuted contract immediately discharging the original claim.66
Many compromise agreements are not substituted contracts,
however, because it is the "performance" that will operate as
a future discharge, the "promise" not being accepted in pres-
ent discharge.6 9 Truly enough, an accord executory may be
made as an agreement for the future discharge of an undis-
puted claim, in which case it would not seem to be a compro-
mise. In the words of Corbin, however, "Most executory ac-
cords are agreements for the future discharge of unliquidated
claims; and in many cases the amount actually due is in
dispute. '70 A compromise, in sum, when not made as a substi-
tuted contract, is an executory accord. 7 1
64. CORBIN § 187 at 165.
65. See generally id. § 1268.
66. Id. See also 1 LITVINOFF § 382 at 644.
67. Id.
68. CORBIN §§ 1062-67. The common-law "substituted contracts" are dis-
cussed at civil law under the heading of "novation"; see LA. CIV. CODE art.
2185. For a discussion of "novation" at common law, see 1 LITVINOFF § 382 at
644 n.94.
69. Owens v. Hunter, 91 Ariz. 7, 368 P.2d 753 (1962).
70. CORBIN § 1027.
71. See GRIsMORE § 212 at 339-40; 1 LITVINOFF § 382 at 644.
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When it is said that an obligation has been discharged by
accord and satisfaction, what is meant is that the discharge
has taken place by the rendering of some performance differ-
ent from the one the creditor claimed as due, and that his
acceptance of the substituted performance is full satisfaction
of the original claim.72 The parties may have previously en-
tered into an accord executory for the future discharge of the
existing claim. If so, after the executory contract is fully
performed in the agreed manner, there is an accord and satis-
faction, and the original claim is discharged.7 3 The parties,
however, may make an accord and satisfaction without a
prior accord executory of any kind, as when the debtor offers
a substituted performance in satisfaction of his debt, and the
creditor receives it, without the parties having made any
binding promises, or when the creditor requests a certain
performance in satisfaction of his claim and the debtor ren-
ders it, again without any prior executory promises. 74 At the
moment of acceptance, this contract has been wholly exe-
cuted and nothing more need be done by either party, as the
original debt has been discharged.7 5 In this perspective, an
accord and satisfaction is an executed accord.7 6
Analyzing common law compromise and accord and satis-
faction in context, the following conclusions may be drawn.
When a claim is disputed or unliquidated, an agreement for a
future discharge by a substituted performance is a compro-
mise, not distinguishable from an accord executory. As an
accord can also be made on an undisputed claim, however, it
follows that "a compromise is always an accord, but that an
accord is not necessarily a compromise. ' '77 When the future
performance takes place it operates as satisfaction and the
72. ANSON at 396; CORBIN § 1276; E. HARRIMAN, CONTRACTS 314 (1901);
WILLISTON § 1838. See also Brock & Blevins Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 951
(1965); Porter v. Berwyn Fuel & Feed Co., 244 Md. 629, 224 A.2d 622 (1965);
Long v. Weiler, 395 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. 1965).
73. 1 LITVINOFF § 383 at 647.
74. Fairchild v. Mathews, 91 Idaho 1, 415 P.2d 43 (1966); Hoadley v.
Hoadley, 114 Vt. 75, 39 A.2d 769 (1944); ANSON at 396; CORBIN § 1276; WILLIS-
TON § 1851.
75. Id. See also 1 LITVINOFF § 383 at 648.
76. See CORBIN §§ 1276-77; WILIUSTON § 1852. See also 1 LITVINOFF § 383
at 648.
77. Eastern Steel Prod. Corp. v. Chesnut, 252 N.C. 269, 271, 113 S.E.2d
587, 589 (1960): "Compromise as distinguished from accord and satisfaction,
must be based on a disputed claim, while accord and satisfaction may be
based on an undisputed or liquidated claim." Id. See CORBIN § 1281.
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obligation is discharged. If then there is a dispute over a
claim, an accord and satisfaction is an executed compromise.7 8
If the parties have previously entered into an accord execu-
tory in the form of a compromise, it is clear that, after having
been performed, the compromise becomes an accord and satis-
faction.79 If no previous compromise was made, if no execu-
tory promises were exchanged but the debtor offered a sum in
full settlement and the creditor accepted right away thereby
effecting a discharge, it is also clear that the parties have
settled their dispute by means of an accord and satisfaction
instead of a compromise. 80
Thus, though different in nature, both may put an end to
a dispute: a compromise because of its very nature, since it is
an agreement specially designed to serve such a purpose; an
accord and satisfaction, because it may serve the same pur-
pose when the parties have entered into it in order to settle a
dispute.81 At any rate, since a valid accord and satisfaction
may occur for purposes other than settling a dispute, its scope
of application is broader than the scope of a compromise. It
can be said that an executed compromise is always an accord
and satisfaction, but that not every accord and satisfaction is
an executed compromise.8 2
As does any other common law contract, an accord,
executory or executed, requires consent and consideration for
its validity. Regarding that which is performed by the debtor,
a performance is nonetheless a substituted one even though
it consists in payment of a sum of money different from the
one claimed by the creditor.83 All such matters, together with
the special problems involved in payment by check and in
payment of what is habitually called the "lesser undisputed
amount," have been fully discussed elsewhere.8 4
It now remains to be seen whether the same connection
between a compromise and an accord and satisfaction that
exists at common law also exists between a civilian transac-
tion and an accord and satisfaction, or, in other words,
whether an accord and satisfaction may also be termed an
78. 1 LrrVINOFF § 387 at 653.
79. CORBIN § 1293.
80. 1 LITVINOFF § 387 at 654.
81. See generally CORBIN § 1278; 1 LITVINOFF § 387 at 654.
82. Id. Eastern Steel Prod. Corp. v. Chesnut, 252 N.C. 269, 113 S.E.2d 587
(1960).
83. CORBIN § 1289; 1 LITVINOFF § 386 at 651-52.
84. 1 LITVINOFF §§ 384-87 at 648-54.
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executed transaction. That question becomes especially rele-
vant in situations where, as in the Steel case, the debtor
sends a sum equivalent to the lesser of two possible amounts
in full payment.
For that purpose, it is worthwhile to remember that a
reasonable apprehension that a suit may be filed, or the
slightest doubt as to the outcome of a suit already filed,
suffices as the cause of a transaction, even when the parties
do not have sufficient reason to believe that the claim or the
right of one of them may be contested or pursued with any
hope of success. 8 5 In the words of the redactors of the French
Civil Code, "The problem of ascertaining whether, under
given circumstances, the party who entered into a transac-
tion could have reasonably been apprehensive of the starting
of litigation, or have sheltered any doubts as to the outcome
of one already started, is, as a matter of course, left to the
appreciation of the courts."8 6
In addition, obtaining immediate payment of a debt or
payment within an agreed delay, as an advantage over the
institution of procedures for the execution of a judgment, is a
valid cause for a transaction, as the interest of the creditor
may be satisfied in a better way by taking this sort of
shortcut rather than facing the difficulties a judicial execu-
tion may present.8 7
Assuming now a controversy between the parties as to
the amount of a debt, the fact that the difference of opinion
consists in whether a lesser or a larger sum is owed does not
make the lesser amount a liquidated one. It has been thus
asserted that a dispute over the amount prevents a debt from
having the character of a liquidated debt, which is a require-
ment for the operation of legal compensation or set off.88 If
that is the case, the creditor who insists on his right to collect
the greater amount would have no other choice than filing
85. 6 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN(CAIS 191 (5th ed. 1920).
86. 18 DURANTON, COURts DE DROIT FRAN(AIS SUIVANT LE CODE CIVIL
395-98 (1834); Bigot-Preameneu, Expos6 des motifs, 15 Locre, Leg. 416, No. 2
(translation in text by author).
87. REQ. Nov. 12, 1902, D.1902.1.566, S.1905.1.14; 6 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANqAIS 192 (5th ed. 1920); 11 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 922 (1932).
88. See FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1289; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2207; 7 PLANIOL
ET RIPERT, TRArrt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 690 (2d ed. Esmein
1954). See also CASS. COM. Oct. 18, 1961, Bull. civ. III, n.366, at 316; Trib. civ.
Lille, April 4, 1958, Gaz. Pal. 1958.2.49; CIV. April 15, 1942, D.C.1943.106.
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suit. On the other hand, to pay his debt is not only the debt-
or's duty, it is also his right. Indeed, when the creditor re-
fuses to collect, the debtor has the right to make a real ten-
der, and on the creditor's refusal to accept it, to deposit the
sum tendered with the court. Though the tender and deposit
must be of the whole of the sum demandable, it has been
repeatedly asserted in French jurisprudence that the ques-
tion of determining whether the sum tendered was sufficient
to discharge the debt is for the court to decide. 9
It is not true then that in such a situation the lesser
amount is "undisputed." When a debt is unliquidated, and the
parties disagree over which of two different amounts is due,
both amounts are "disputed." It is not as though the parties
agree that the debtor owes "at least" the lesser amount,
because the debtor's contention is that he owes "only" the
lesser amount. His right to be exonerated upon payment
sufficiently explains why he cannot be forced to deliver as
part payment the sum that he, in good faith, may consider to
be the full payment of his obligation.9"
In that situation the creditor might very well regard with
apprehension the necessity of having to sue or the chance of
being sued by the debtor. The prevention of either alternative
is a valid cause for a transaction or compromise. With such a
dispute in the background, then, reception by the creditor of
the lesser amount, in money or check, in full payment, to-
gether with his keeping the money or cashing or endorsing
the check, seems to have all the necessary elements of an
implied consent given to the transaction offered by the
debtor.9 1
The objection still could be raised that in such a case
there are no reciprocal concessions from the parties, as the
debtor who pays the sum he thinks he owes is apparently
making no concession to his creditor. The objection can be
easily overcome through the realization that in a contract of
transaction or compromise the cause is twofold.9 2 One is the
special cause, the end shared in the contemplation of both
parties, which is to avoid litigation. The other is the ordinary
89. See FRENCH CxV. CODE art. 1258(3) and LA. CIV. CODE art. 2168(3). See
also CIV. May 12, 1952, D.1952. 793; May 24, 1927, D.H.1927.349.
90. 1 LITVINOFF § 399 at 675.
91. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1811, 1816, 1818.
92. See 1 LITVINOFF § 228 at 409-11 & § 378 at 639-40. See also CAPITANT,
DE LA CAUSE DES OBLIGATIONS 13 nn.1, 31, 41, & 43 (1923).
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cause or that which the parties concede themselves recipro-
cally, each one in view of the other's concession. 93 Because it
is supported by strong public policy reasons, the special cause
overshadows the ordinary one which may thus be found even
in minimal aspects of the agreement. The fact that the debt-
or, although paying what he thinks he owes, notwithstanding
gives up the satisfaction of having the court declare that he
was right, or the fact that the debtor might have gone to
great difficulty to secure the money paid suffices to fulfill the
requirement of an ordinary cause in a transaction. In other
words, just as the slightest doubt of which litigation may
derive suffices to provide a transaction with a special cause,
in like manner the slightest inducement furnished by the
other party suffices as a valid ordinary cause for the same
contract. 9 '
The last point left for clarification involves the fulfillment
of a formal requirement. Louisiana courts have repeatedly
asserted that a writing is required to give validity to a trans-
action, a correct conclusion under Louisiana Civil Code article
3071.95 That a check is such a writing, as Louisiana courts
have held on several occasions, is also a correct conclusion
under article 2243.98 When a certain amount is paid in full by
check, the formal requirement is met.
Louisiana courts have not always said, as in Charles X.
Miller, Inc. v. Oak Builders, Inc., that accord and satisfaction
is a notion imported from the common law. At times the
jurisprudence has drawn a distinction between "transaction
or compromise" and "accord and satisfaction. ' ' 97 At other
93. 1 LrrviNoF § 399 at 675.
94. Id. 675-76.
95. See Charbonnet v. Ochsner, 258 La. 507, 513, 246 So. 2d 844, 846 (1971);
Witherwax v. Zurich Ins. Co., 315 So. 2d 420 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Bugg v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 194, 198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974);
Dunham Concrete Prod., Inc. v. Donnell Const. Co., 268 So. 2d 104 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1972).
96. See Thompson v. Stacy, 148 So. 2d 834, 836 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963):
"Plaintiff contends that an agreement of compromise must be in writing ....
Here, there was a writing, to-wit, both the check and the invoice ... ." See
also Theatre Time Clock Co. v. Motion Picture Adv. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 172,
175 (E.D. La. 1971): "Here there was a writing, a check made out in full
settlement"...." See also C. & M. Properties, Inc. v. R.B. Alexander. Inc., 219
So. 2d 229 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
97. See Pipes v. Jesse F. Heard & Sons, Inc., 258 So. 2d 187 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1972): "Whether the transaction at issue is referred to as a compromise
and settlement or an accord and satisfaction is of no importance as we
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times the two expressions have been used indistinctly
thereby implying that a valid transaction or compromise may
be effected through the mechanism of an accord and satisfac-
tion.98 The latter is the most satisfactory approach in the
context of the Louisiana law because the contract of transac-
tion, at civil law, is flexible enough to produce the same re-
sults achieved through an accord and satisfaction at common
law in situations involving payment of the lesser "undis-
puted" amount of an otherwise disputed claim.9
understand the definition of these terms .... Any claim that is satisfied by
some substituted performance is discharged by an 'accord and satisfaction.'
If the claim discharged in this matter was a disputed claim or one in which
there is some area of doubt then the transaction is also a 'compromise.' "Id.
at 190.
98. See Hancock v. Lincoln American Life Ins. Co., 278 So. 2d 561 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 281 So: 2d 754 (1973), quoting Pontchartrain Park
Homes v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 246 La. 893, 168 So. 2d 595 (1964).
99. See 1 LITVINOFF § 393 at 20-21 (Supp. 1975).
